In the first half of the 1980s it was marked by the resuscitation of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s decision to develop new nuclear missiles (SS-20s) in its European territories was followed by the installation of corresponding US missile systems in Western Europe, despite the reactions of European public opinion. At the same time, the new US government under Ronald Reagan was determined to put more pressure on the USSR at a strategic, political and economic level with the aim of demonstrating the weakness of the communist system and to force the communist superpower to negotiate. This period, named after the relevant literature “Second Cold War”, was characterized by international polarization, intense rhetorical controversies between the USSR and the US, but also by increasing the likelihood of a military crisis between the two superpowers, which could end up in Nuclear Holocaust. At this critical juncture, the downing of a South Korean passenger aircraft from Moscow on September 1, 1983 would raise the international thermometer dangerously and mark the culmination of the “Second Cold War”.
The fateful Kal-007 flight
The fatal flight of Korean Airlines (KAL-77) starting with New York and the destination of Seoul carried 269 passengers including a member of the US House of Representatives. When the Boeing 747 aircraft took off from Ankorage, Alaska, where he had stopped refueling, began to deviate significantly from his course, entered Soviet airspace and was found to be overwhelmed by Soviet military facilities. Although several parts of history remain dark, it seems that the course of the aircraft is due to the incorrect use of navigation systems. It is striking, of course, that no one from the crew realized that a few hours after taking off the Korean Jambo was hundreds of miles off the way.
Given the tension with Washington, the Soviet military leadership was quite nervous. The Soviets knew about the action of spying US aircraft in the area and as soon as the carefree Korean aircraft entered the Soviet forbidden airspace, they assumed that it was an American ID. Four Soviet warplanes (three Su-15 and one MIG-23) were ordered to intercept the target. When one of the Su-15 pilots approached the aircraft, he found that it was a passenger boeing but that did not mean that there could be no military aircraft properly adapted to look like a political one. A few minutes later and after some failed recognition attempts, the same pilot was ordered to overthrow the aircraft. Two air-to-air missiles hit the South Korean plane sending to death and 269 occupants. The incident showed the deficiency of Soviet air defense and control systems in the area and involved the USSR in a crisis that would exit its prestige seriously injured.
The American -Soviet confrontation
The Americans were convinced from the outset that the Soviets could not help but know that the plane that entered their airspace was a political aircraft full of innocent passengers. His retirement seemed to solemnly confirm Reagan’s narrative of the Soviet Union as a “empire of evil” that gave little value to human life. In addition to their genuine disgust for the loss of so many people, many of whom were American citizens, the US leaders were also determined to win a great propaganda victory over the USSR. US officials denounced the “Soviet barbarism” and presented evidence-including underlying signals from the Su-15 that shot down the Korean jambo-which seemed to prove that Moscow had overthrown the aircraft. The New York Times accused Moscow of “cold -blooded murder”, while Reagan himself described the incident as “slaughter” and “crime against humanity”, calling on the whole world to condemn the “empire of evil”.
Two air-to-air rockets hit the aircraft over the island of Sahalin, sending and 269 passengers to death.
Moscow’s jerk management of the crisis has reinforced the image of a tired and aged Soviet leadership outside of the international reality. At first the Soviets denied the incident but then argued that the Korean aircraft was on a spy mission. In Moscow, the flight was a well -designed challenge from Washington, aiming to provoke the USSR’s reaction and thus lead to the destabilization of the international situation. The Soviet leaders were deeply distrustful to Reagan and his staff and did not seem to be the possibility of the American attitude of being part of an attempt to get Moscow involved in a war adventure with the US.
In any case, American-Soviet relationships were at the lowest point perhaps by the Cuba crisis in 1962. The incident of Kal-007’s downfall showed that in a polarized international environment, a series of small errors could lead to a major crisis, with a risk still danger, with a risk And for world peace. Also, the unexplained attitude of the USSR, which was not of particular interest to the lost human lives, gave a great victory at the level of international impressions in Washington, thus confirming its position on the inhumane face of communism.
Greece’s attitude is causing a crisis with the EEC
Despite the worldwide outcry caused by the downfall of the Korean aircraft and the immediate condemnation of the USSR by the majority of the Western countries, the government of Andrea Papandreou did not follow the west line, nor was it prepared to discuss the possibility of Western sanctions. On the contrary, Athens, which also practiced the EEC’s presidency in the second half of 1983, vetoed its European partners’ initiative for a unanimous conviction of the USSR. The weakness of European political cooperation, the mechanism set up within the EEC to coordinate the foreign policy policy, to take a position on such a serious issue has been a major blow to Europe’s ability to speak with one voice to the international Issues. The stance of the Greek government was strongly criticized by other European governments, while German Foreign Minister Hans-Drich Genser has openly accused Greece of plunging the community into a crisis of confidence. The Greek attitude also caused severe discomfort in Washington. Papandreou himself moved rhetorically closer to Soviet positions, arguing in various cases that Korean jambo was indeed on a CIA spy and that Greece would do accordingly if it was in the USSR position. The rhetorical exaggerations of the Greek Prime Minister did not go unnoticed by the American press and periodically strengthened the already strained Greek -American relations.
The tragic incident showed that in a polarized international environment, a series of small mistakes could lead to a major crisis, even with the risk of world peace.
Papandreou’s political calculations
It should be noted that the Greek attitude did not reflect any disposition with the West but was dictated by Papandreou’s political calculations. Despite his pre -election commitments to withdraw the US bases and release from NATO, the Greek Prime Minister had understood that Greece’s possible removal from the West would have a negative impact on national security and in particular the country’s deterrent capacity to Turkey. Consequently, the PASOK government signed a new defense agreement with the US in September 1983, expanding the stay of US bases for another five years and did not seriously question NATO’s participation in NATO. But facing serious reactions from the inside of his party, Papandreou had to show that his pre -election announcements of a “independent” foreign policy had not been abandoned. Thus, despite the fact that he had faced critical issues of Greek foreign policy, the Greek prime minister chose to vary significantly in various issues of international interest, often provoking the country’s western allies.
The stance adopted by the Greek government in relation to Korean jambo was the culmination of Greek differentiation on East -West issues. It created a crisis in Athens’ relations with the EEC and greatly contributed to the consolidation of Greece as an unreliable and unpredictable partner within the community. He also performed tension in Athens -Washington relations, which, despite the fact that the 1983 Greek -American agreement sealed the Greek -American strategic relationship, would still take several years to normalize.
*Mr. Ioannis Halkos is a Doctor of History of the European University Institute, a postdoctoral researcher of the NCSR.
*Curated by: Evanthis Hatzivasiliou
