The declassification of the 58 daily information bulletins on Cyprus and Turkey, from the period July – August 1974, offers some useful conclusions about the identity and the mode of operation of the former State Intelligence Service. Despite the fact that historical research has documented the role of the KYP during the Seven Years period, little is known about the involvement of the Greek secret services in the events of 1974.
First of all, it is necessary to make a historical review of the presence of the KYP in Cyprus. The Service was founded after World War II by the Papagou government, with the main mission of monitoring communist activities. However, the beginning of the Unification Struggle in the mid-1950s forced the KYP to show interest in what was going on in Cyprus. After the creation of the Republic of Cyprus the agency continued to have a strong presence on the island, especially after the outbreak of intercommunal riots in 1963.
One of the first moves of the April 21 regime was to replace the agency’s commander, Kyriakos Papageorgopoulos, who did not participate in the coup. The new strongman of the KYP was now the Juntic Artillery officer Alexandros Hatzipetros, who created new intelligence networks in Cyprus. The intelligence gathering focused more on Archbishop Makarios’ movements and less on Turkey’s actions on the island. The same practice was continued by the next two commanders, Michalis Roufogalis and Lambros Stathopoulos, who were also appointed by the junta to lead the KYP.
KYP had managed to develop important human networks on the island that provided crucial primary information.
Regarding the specific bulletins, the collection of information is mainly based on open sources such as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot press. However, it is quickly realized that the KYP had managed to develop important human networks on the island that offered crucial primary information. This helped her a lot to record and analyze, before the coup of July 15, the intense confrontations between Makari and anti-Makiari forces. This possibility does not exist to the same extent after the Turkish invasion of July 20. The editors of the bulletins do not seem to know enough about the movements of EOKA B΄ in the free areas. This may mean that either these anti-Makarian forces had completely become independent after the fall of the junta, or that the KYP was trying to hide information about the action of EOKA B΄.
At the same time, however, the Service had a very good picture of the action of the Turkish forces at the operational and tactical level between July 23 and August 16. On August 4, for example, the author of the note rightly warns that “only the opposition of forces will limit” the other side’s effort to seize as much territory as it can. The next day, the bulletin accurately predicts the Turkish operation against the towns of Lapithos and Karavas, which finally happened after a few hours. The KYP also collects important information on military and civilian actions in Mersina and distant Isparta. He still manages to get a very good image of the British agent in Cyprus. These alone demonstrate the operational capabilities that KYP had at the time outside of a friendly environment. Rightly so, the current commander of the Service considers that the declassification of these documents can contribute to the improvement of official self-awareness.
Mr. Manos Karagiannis is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia and Reader in International Security at King’s College London. His book “Deterrence and Defense” is published by Papadopoulos publications.
